Listening & Learning - Signs of Intelligence

The recently leaked National Intelligence Estimate regarding the state of jihadist terrorism in relation to the war in Iraq has, as expected, become a political hand grenade. Now we wait to find out if the pin has been pulled and who will be holding it when it blows up. The Dims attacked immediately – no surprise there – and the Rebs countered by declassifying the “Key Judgments” section of the NIE. That section provides ammunition for each party. But, after reading it I think it provides M-16 rifle ammo for the Rebs and M-1Abrams tank ammo for the Dims.

For the Rebs, the NIE offers the following:

§ US-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, al-Qa’ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. [Question: if serious damage to its leadership and operations isn’t enough to keep al-Qa’ida from being the greatest threat to the U.S., then what will alleviate that threat?]

§ Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida, could erode support for the jihadists. [Question: isn’t this process going to take about the same amount of time it took to embed the lack of pluralism and responsive, sustained and multifaceted systems and programs in the Muslim nations – i.e., many, many generations?]

§ Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight. [Question: is there sufficient comfort in the words “should” and “fewer”?]

For the Dims, the NIE offers the following:

§ The global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. [Question: when is our strategy going to stem the spread and overcome the adaptation?]

§ A large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in number and geographic dispersion. If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide. [Question: are we heading to a safer America or an increasingly threatened America?]

§ The Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere. [Question: haven’t we created a breeding ground in Iraq that will produce several waves of jihadist leadership?]

§ The Iraq conflict has become the “cause celebre” for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. [Question: what does this say about “staying the course” in this “cause celebre”?]

§ Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq “jihad;” (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims – all of which jihadists exploit. [Question: does our political leadership see the ways in which the US is implicated in each of these “fuel” factors; can we simply declare ourselves to be free of any responsibility for the spread of the jihadist movement?]

§ Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

§ The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. The resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa’ida. [Question: what does this say about the decision to turn attention from pursuing Bin Ladin in Afghanistan to pursuing Saddam Hussein in Iraq?]

§ Anti-US sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. [Question: have we considered that we might be fueling non-Islamic ignition sources in the world?]

§ The underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of the NIE. [Question: isn’t it obvious that we have to do something different to shift this balance?]

The NIE seems to answer this last question by concluding that, “Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.” Given this assessment, when are we going to move beyond “capture and kill” operations and pursue the coordinated multilateral efforts that the entire U.S. intelligence community is recommending?

The NIE also concludes that the jihadists’ greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution – an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari’a-based governance spanning the Muslim world – is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. However, extracting a solution to jihadist terrorism from this vulnerability will require actions outside and beyond those being taken by the US in Iraq. The ray of hope offered by this vulnerability may never break through as long as we continue occupying a Muslim country.

Building on this potential, the NIE says, “Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.”

Mind you, this commentary is not from some liberal think tank, some leftist-leaning East coast editorial page, or some hippie-invested college campus – it’s from the collective, “all-source” U.S. intelligence community – a community that it trying harder than ever to get it right now after having gotten it so wrong between September 2001 and March 2003.

It might be time for us to manifest two essential signs of intelligence – listening and learning.