This is the third time that I’ve gotten high-centered on a posting that involves the Bush administration and a decision related to Iraq. The president announced his “new way forward” in Iraq on January 10. I started this posting on January 11. It’s taken eight days to get back to it, not for lack of interest but for lack of knowing where to stop. I have trouble moving on to other topics I want to write about when a topic that I think is more important is in the queue. I’ve got to find my own version of a new way forward.
The January 10 speech was fairly well written and was more substantive and informative than most prior speeches given by the president on the subject of Iraq. While it lacked any inspirational or emotional punch it was by and large free of campaign-like slogans and attempts at catchy phrases. To his credit, the president acknowledged that the administration’s strategy has not worked; that mistakes have been made; and that he accepts personal responsibility for those mistakes.
Unfortunately, the speech revealed a new tactical approach more than it revealed a new strategy. My comment that night, one that has since been echoed by countless others, is “Too little, too late”.
We’re sending in an additional 21,500 troops, with 17,500 soldiers headed to Baghdad and 4,000 Marines headed to Anbar province. This deployment, which will cost almost $6 billion, will unfold over the next 3 – 5 months. In addition, we’re tossing in $1.1 billion in economic aid, spread among three focal points.
The tactical shift is built around the idea that Iraqi security forces will now take the lead in quelling the Sunni insurgency and the sectarian militias and death squads, with the Americans being in something akin to a support role. Supposedly, this leadership change will be immediate in Baghdad and completed by November in the provinces.
That’s it. A 16% increase in troop levels, with most of those troops being dropped into the midst of an escalating civil war, and the equivalent of an economic band-aid for a country that has a completely broken infrastructure. In short, there’s not much “new” here and it remains to be seen if there’s anything “forward” about this “way” of doing things. Frankly, I don’t know how we can get the “forward” without the “new”. Nonetheless, I hope and pray that it works.
Sadly, America has been hoping and praying for success for almost four years. Every other new shift of strategy or tactics has failed, including two Baghdad-focused shifts within the last year (Operation Together Forward I & II). One of the problems is that we can’t do this on our own. We have to have the full and unwavering commitment of the Iraqi government and its security forces. Therein lays one of the major flaws in this plan.
In effect, we’re relying on Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the same man whom Stephen Hadley, the president’s national security advisor, branded as potentially unreliable just a month or two ago. Unfortunately, the prime minister has a track record, and it’s not one that justifies laying down a big wager to “win”. The president’s plan lays out a number of milestones that have to be met by the Iraqi government, most of which have been previously requested or “demanded” and most of which have never been met.
But, there’s an even bigger hang-up here and it goes by the name of Muqtada al-Sadr, the violently anti-American Shiite cleric who controls the infamous Mahdi militia and a phalanx of death squads who bear significant responsibility for the escalating sectarian violence. No less than 30 members of the Iraqi parliament are members of al-Sadr’s party, and those 30 members effectively prop up the prime minister’s government. If they withdraw their support, the current coalition government collapses. The insidious influence of ad-Sadr was never more apparent than at the hanging of Saddam Hussein. The last words Saddam heard were guards yelling the praises of al-Sadr not the praises of the al-Maliki government that was supposedly carrying out the execution.
More disturbing than these generalities are the reports from multiple media sources connected to members of the al-Maliki inner circle who indicate that the Iraqi prime minister doesn’t want an American troop increase – he wants just the opposite – for the Americans to draw down and “let history run its course”. Last week,
The New York Times reported that al-Maliki sent a written recommendation to that effect to the White House on November 30. A little more than a month later the president is on TV announcing that a troop increase is part and parcel of a new
Iraqi security plan. Really?
By the way, when al-Maliki says that he wants history to run its course, that means let the Shiites have their turn on the butt-end of the rifles with the Sunnis staring into the business end for a few decades. Guess who that invites to the table – the Saudis, who are Sunni. In the last 10 days they’ve not only joined the Sunnis in Iraq in supporting the president’s plan, to no one’s surprise, they’ve also indicated that if the Americans leave, then the Saudis will be compelled to enter Iraq to protect the Sunni minority. This is, plain and simple, a war of religion being fought along sectarian lines. This is no longer a war on terrorism, except to the extent that both sides of this sectarian war are employing terrorism against each other, with Americans being caught in the crossfire. It’s not our ballgame any longer. It was when we started it, and we bear a large share of the responsibility for many (but not all) of the consequences, but this conflict has outgrown our intention and our presence.
But, we’re still on the field, where we obviously have to rely on our military and its leadership. Unfortunately, for the first time in this ill-fated endeavor we appear to have disconnected the military and political leadership – they're no longer aligned. Before the president made his decision to increase troop strength, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Abizaid and General Casey all made it clear that a troop “surge” was not their recommendation. Former generals, Colin Powell and Barry McCaffrey, the leaders in the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq, have added their opposition to this plan. General McCaffrey, joined by three other retired generals who testified against the plan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, referred to it as “a fool’s errand”.
Rather than following the recommendations of his military leaders, the president has decided to replace them with new leaders who will follow his recommendations. That is the prerogative of the commander-in-chief. But for several years this president has defended his war strategy by claiming that he has relied on the advice of our military leadership, a cover that he will no longer have. The strategy in Iraq, for the first time since the invasion, is now owned by one man.
General Casey, the current commander in Iraq, will apparently be replaced by General David Petraeus. Petraeus is the military equivalent of an alpha-wolf. He comes with a very impressive resume, including a PhD in international relations from Princeton. If military success rests on the uniformed man in charge, then he’s as good a shot at that success as we could hope for. After all, this is the man who wrote the Army’s brand new, hot-off-the-shelf counter-insurgency manual. This is his expertise. But on day one in Iraq he will face a status on the ground that can only be described as grossly inadequate based on that manual.
The new manual says that when attempting to counter an insurgency the troop levels should be at the ratio of 20 troops for every 1,000 residents being secured. That suggests the need for 100,000 – 250,000
more troops in Iraq, depending on the number of residents those troops are intended to secure. That would bring the force levels up to the level that General Eric Shinseki, the former Army Chief of Staff, said was needed in the first place, an opinion for which he was soundly rebuked by Donald Rumsfeld, who called Shinseki’s estimate “wildly off the mark”. Any way you cut it, 21,500 more troops doesn’t cut it.
Then, only yesterday, General Casey says that we might be able to start drawing
down troop levels in the late summer. When I read that I looked around to see if the Mad Hatter was anywhere nearby. We will only complete our brand new, hot-off-the-shelf troop buildup by early summer. So we now expect they will have made Baghdad and Anbar safe and sound in a matter of a few fortnights? Who would have thought it would be that quick and easy?
Other than in the ranks of the partisan hardcore, it’s hard to find too many people who wholeheartedly support this new way forward. Several Reb senators have expressed opposition, with several others likely to follow. That breakdown in party solidarity may be coming from the fact that more than 70% of the American public now disapprove of the administration’s handling of the war – and, according to the most recent poll by the
Military Times, for the first time a majority of the troops in Iraq now share that same opinion.
Supporters of the plan, like Senators McCain and Graham, ask those who favor either an immediate or phased withdrawal: “What will we do when Iraq and possibly the region collapse into utter chaos after we leave?” That’s a fair question. But that line of reasoning clearly leads to the possibility that we can never leave Iraq because it may never be secure enough without our presence (of course that begs the question as to whether our presence can ever achieve security, there being ample evidence that Iraq is sliding deeper into chaos with us there).
What then? Is there no point at which America gets to say to the Iraqis, “That’s it; we’ve done what we can do; this is your country and its problems are yours to solve from this point on.” After all, those who truly believe that we’ve already made a meaningful difference in Iraq by helping it develop a democratic constitution and elect a representative government, should believe that we are leaving it better than we found it. It’s ironic that many of those who want us to leave now are the people who believe that we may be leaving it worse than we found it.
Our invasion created many of the conditions that have led to the situation that currently exists there. Before we invaded, al-Qaeda was not welcome in Iraq; there was no insurgency; there was no civil war between Sunnis and Shiites; there was no threatened intervention from Iran and Saudi Arabia. There was brutal sectarian oppression to be sure, which only highlights the fact that sectarian divisions were deeply entrenched before we got there and will remain deeply entrench long after we leave – they’ve just been exacerbated by the complete destabilization of the country since March 2003.
There’s still a significant divide in this country because there’s no good answer to the question – what should we do next in that country? We have to face up the increasingly likely probability that this chapter in U.S. and world history is not going to have a good ending. We have to pick the ending from the choices we have, not from the choices we really, really want to have. And we have to make that choice well before President Bush hands the war over to someone else in January 2009.
It’s time to adopt and implement an exit strategy that has been completed before the election in November 2008. By that time this president will have had over five years to fulfill his vision in Iraq. If he can’t get the “mission accomplished” in five years then he should clean up his own mess rather than leaving it for someone else. When we get to that point maybe we can finally turn our attention back to Afghanistan and the elimination of the Taliban and the capture of Osama bin Laden. Only then will we have responded appropriately to the attack on September 11, 2001.
Thus ends the longest posting I’ve made on this blog. Like I said, I need to find a new way forward.